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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos. 09-2552 & 09-2702
____________
INTERSTATE REALTY CO., L.L.C.,
Appellant in No. 09-2552
vs.
SEARS ROEBUCK & COMPANY,
Appellant in No. 09-2702
____________
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-06-cv-05997 )
District Judge: Honorable Dickinson R. Debevoise
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
February 22, 2010
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 30, 2010)
____________
OPINION

WEIS, Circuit Judge.
In this case, the parties dispute the interpretation of an exclusivity provision
in a lease granted to Sears Roebuck & Co. by Interstate Realty Company, the owners of
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the Cedar Knolls Plaza shopping mall. Interstate claims that it was unable to lease space
in the mall to a prospective tenant as a result of that disagreement.
Interstate filed a complaint seeking damages from Sears, alleging tortious
interference with prospective economic advantage and contractual rights, as well as
breach of contract. In addition, Interstate asked for a declaratory judgment. Ruling on
Sears’ motion for summary judgment, the District Court granted declaratory relief to
Interstate but dismissed its other claims with prejudice. After thorough consideration of
both parties’ appeals, we will affirm the District Court’s order in its entirety.
The lease, which the parties executed in 1996, stated that the “[p]remises
may be used by [Sears] for the sale, servicing and storing of merchandise, [and] all other
items or services normally sold in Sears Hardware Stores.” Interstate also acceded to
Sears’ request for a restrictive covenant, entitled “Exclusive Use.” This limitation
provided that, with certain exceptions, Interstate would not lease to a tenant that would
use the premises “for the sale of certain items or services which would normally be sold
in a ‘Sears Hardware Store[ ]’ . . . including, without limitation, the sale of hardware
materials, tools and supplies, paint, plants, and power and non-power lawn and garden
equipment, tools and supplies.”
In 2004, as part of a national program, Sears’ Cedar Knolls location was
converted into a “Sears Appliance and Hardware” store. By February 2006, the store was
selling washers, dryers, refrigerators, dishwashers, and other household appliances and
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fixtures.
After negotiating with Interstate for some months, prospective tenant Karl’s
Sales and Service Company, LLC, asked Interstate to furnish a letter from Sears
acknowledging that Karl’s could sell washers, dryers, refrigerators, and similar items at
Cedar Knolls notwithstanding the exclusivity provision. Interstate notified Sears of the
pending negotiations by letter dated February 1, 2006, and requested Sears’ consent to
Karl’s sales of appliances. Sears declined, and, after additional negotiations were
unsuccessful, Karl’s acquired space in another location. Throughout this process,
Interstate controlled the flow of information between Sears and Karl’s.
In granting the declaratory judgment requested by Interstate, the District
Court held that, under the terms of the lease, Sears could change the name of the store and
the merchandise sold. However, no right existed to expand the scope of the exclusivity
clause. We agree that the plain meaning of the Exclusive Use clause limits its application
to items typically sold in “Sears Hardware Stores.” Because Sears has failed to “provide[
] a reasonable alternative reading of the contract under which [Interstate] would not be
entitled to” declaratory judgment on this point, such relief was properly granted.1 Arnold
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That this relief was entered sua sponte does not alter our conclusion.
Both parties had ample opportunity to argue the breadth and scope of the Exclusive Use
provision, the interpretation of which was central to the declaratory judgment ruling. See
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 241 n.6 (3d Cir. 2009) (fact that court granted
summary judgment sua sponte did not require remand where parties “were on notice that
the District Court may have been considering [grounds for summary judgment not
requested by parties] at that time and . . . had an opportunity to respond on this issue”).
3

M. Diamond, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Trailing Co., 180 F.3d 518, 521-22 (3d Cir. 1999)
(setting forth standard of review in cases involving summary judgment on issue of
contract interpretation).
With respect to the tortious interference claims, the District Court
concluded that, because Sears had not acted with malice, Interstate failed to demonstrate a
genuine issue of material fact. We agree. See Lamorte Burns & Co., Inc. v. Walters, 770
A.2d 1158, 1170 (N.J. 2001) (to succeed on claim of tortious interference with
prospective economic advantage, plaintiff must show malice, i.e., “that harm was inflicted
intentionally and without justification or excuse”); see also Dello Russo v. Nagel, 817
A.2d 426, 434 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (same showing required for tortious
interference with contractual relations claim).
Interstate never communicated to Sears that Karl’s was willing to explore
various compromises regarding the exclusivity clause, nor did it share Sears’ proposed
resolutions with Karl’s. Sears, for its part, discussed internally the reach of the Exclusive
Use provision before responding to Interstate. In these circumstances, Sears’ conduct
cannot be deemed “both injurious and transgressive of generally accepted standards of
common morality or of law.” Lamorte Burns, 770 A.2d at 1170-71 (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
For similar reasons, the District Court found no genuine fact issue as to
Sears’ alleged breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Our review
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of the record leads us to the same conclusion. For the reasons set forth in the preceding
paragraph, Sears’ conduct gives no suggestion of “bad motive or intention,” proof of
which “is vital to an action for breach of the covenant.” Brunswick Hills Racquet Club,
Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 864 A.2d 387, 396 (N.J. 2005) (quotation marks
and citation omitted).
We commend the District Court’s comprehensive and painstaking analysis
in this matter. Finding no reversible error, we will affirm the Order of the District Court.
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